Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

J. Lamar Richards and Lynn P. Richards v. John
Vatsis : Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth M. Hisatake; Attorney for Appellant;
Richard R. Wilkins; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Richards v. Vatsis, No. 10049 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4476

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.- ·tt
\-}"'\

\

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U~fHj

LEI

APR 2 -1964
J. LAMAR RICHARDS Wid
LYNNE P. RICHARDS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.

10049

JOHN VATSIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAIN'TIFFS-RE'SPONDEN'TS
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third District 'Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Judge
WATKINS & WILKINS
WA~TER P. FABER, JR.
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
KENNE'TH M. HISATAKE
445 East Second South
'Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATE'MENT OF THE KIND OF CASE-------------------1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------1
RELIE'F SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------1
STATE'MENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------2
ARGUME'NT:
POINT I. RESPONDENTS COULD NOT HAVE
ELECTED TO KEEP ANY EARNEST 'MONEY
PAID UNDER THE AGREEMENT SUE'D UPON
BECAUSE RESPONDENTS RECEIVE'D NOTH4
ING FROM APPELLAN'T. -----------------------------------POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSESSED DAMAGES AGAINST A!PPEULANT
INASMUCH AS RESPONDENTS COULD NOT
HAVE MADE AN ELECTION ANTI CONSEQUENTLY THE DAMAGES WOULD THE'N
BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OFFER AND THE ACTUAL 'MARKE'T VALUE
8
OF THE PROPERTY. -------------------------------------------CONCIJUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
CASES CITED
Afton Livestock Co. v. Peterson, 62 Utah 4'37, 220
6
Pac. 710 ---------------------------------------------------------------------Andreason v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d
404 ------------------------------------------------------------------------5, 6, 7' 9
Close v. Blumenthal, 11 Utah 2d 51, 3'54 P.2d 856 ________
5
Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 ---------------Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 'Utah 415, ·25
p .2d 952 -----------------------------------------------------------------------Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483,
123 Pac. 97 ---------------------------------------------------------------McKown v. Driver, 54 Wash. 2d 46, 337 P.2d 1068____

8

McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 Utah 2d, 349 P.2d 720 --------

5

Paloni v. Beebe, 100 Utah 115, 110 P.2d 563 ---------------Pm-kins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 ____________

6
9

6
7
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

J. LAMAR RICH'ARDS !and
LYNNE P. RICHARDS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No.

vs.

10049

JOHN VATSIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDEN'T'S BR'IEF
STATE'MENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE
'I'he action in the lower court was brought by
a seller of real estate for damages arising from the
buyer's breach of the earnest money agreement.
DTSPOSITION IN LOWER COUR T
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson presiding, gave judgment
against the defendant.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON ~PPEAL
The Appellant-defendant seeks complete rever1
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sal of the judgment against h'im or a modification
of the damages a warded to Respondents.
STATEMENT OF FkCTS
Respondents offer :additional facts that were
omitted from Appellant's Statement of Facts because
there were two earnest money agreements between
the Respondents and the Appellant in this case, and
it is ne~cessary to set forth the circum'Stances surrounding both agreements, even ·tjhough the action
was brought only under the second iagreement.
On August 7, 1962, the Appellant, John Vatsis,
entered into an earnest money agreement with Respondents whereby Appellant pa:id $100.00 to the
real es'tate agent a'S earnest money on the sale of
Respondents' home which was priced iat $31,000.00
(EXhibits R-144). As a part of this agreement Appellant traded his equity in his home to the Respondents (Exhibits R-144). Appellant represented to
and contracted with Respondents that there was no
lien on the home he was trading to them (R-141).
However, Appellant breached his :agreement with
Respondents as there w.as a prior $4,000.00 judgment aga:inst Appellant constituting a lien against
the trade-in house of Appellant. Appellant had not
disclosed to Respondents the existence of the lien
(R-141). Respondents asked Appellant to remove
the lien to conforn1 to the agreement. AppeHant did
not remove the lien and, therefore, the Respondents,
several times prior to October 9, 1962, asked Appellant to n1ove from the Respondents' home (R-141).
2
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Because of the judgment lien, both Appellant and
Respondents considered the first earnest money
agreement terminated. (Vatsis Deposition pp. 35,
38. R-t38-139). Other than the $100.00 earnest
money 1and $120.00 rent from a third party which
Respondents received from the trade-in house, no
money was paid by Appellant to Respondents under
this agreement of August 7, 1962 (R-139, 142),
although by its terms larger payments were required. (Exhibits R-144).
After Respondents had several times requested
Appellant to move because Appellant had breached
the first earnest money agreement, the Appellant
and the real estate agent made a new earnest money
agreement (Exhibits R-144) which was to be presented for Respondents' approval to enable Appellant to s'tay in the Responden·ts' house (R-105, Vatsis DepositJion p. 35). This second earnest money
agreement was dated October 9, 196'2, and contained
a recital that $350.00 was paid as earnest money.
The agreement does not indicate how the earnest
money was to be paid or how it had 'been paid (Exhibits R-144). The Appellant made out a check 'to
Respondents for $250.00 and the real estate agent
apparently agreed to credit Appellant with $100.00
because Appellant had previously paid $100.00 under
the first agreement. Respondents never a nthorized
such an arrangement and the earnest money agreement does not show it (R-67, Exhibits R-144). This
second earnest money agreement set the price of
Respondents' house . at $27,750.00 which was
$1,250.00 less than the original agreement.
3
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Appellant stopped payment on the $250.00
check (R-98), and moved out of Respondents' home
on November 2nd or 3rd, 19S:2, without making any
other payment to Respondents under the second
agreement. (Appellant was unaware that !his wife
had moved out of the home until some time later
as he was out of town (R~104-105) ). Mter Appellant moved from the house, Respondents made extensive efforts to sell the home (R-64, 65, 86), and
finally sold 'i't to a third party for $'27,000.00 (Exhibits, R-144), which was $~2,7'50.00 less than the
price set in the second earnest money agreement.
Respondents brought an action agiainst Appellant for breach of contract and the lower court
a warded damages to Respondents, finding ~ba:t the
$100.00 was paid under the first agreement iand
belonged wholly to the Respondents inasmuch as
there was a clear breach of the first agreement ( R47) . As a result of the stop payment order of the
$250.00 check, no earnest money was paid under
the second agreement and consequently, the Respondents could not be put to an election of remedies
and could not be required to tender back earnest
monies they had not received.
1

ARGUMEN'T
POINT I.
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT HAVE E'LECTED
TO KEEP ANY EARNEST MONEY PAin UNDER THE
AGREEMENT SUED UPON BECAUSE RESPONDENTS
RCgiVED NOTHING FROM APPElJLAN'T.

Appellant relies on the rule of Andreason v.
·1
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Hansen, 8 Utah 2d. 370, 335, P.2d. 404 ( 1959) and
followed in subsequent cases, that a seller of real
estate who does ndt tender return of or return earnest money pa:id has elected to keep such payments as
liquidated damages and is barred from suing for
damages under the agreement. It is submitted that
the present situation is :£actually different from the
Andreason case because the Respondents did not
receive any earnest money or consideration from
Appellants under the earnest money agreement sued
upon. The earnest money agreement of October 9,
19'62 sued upon (Exhibits, R-144) states in line
3 that tlle sum of $'350.00 was deposited as earnest
money, whereas in fact, the Appellant deposited only
a check in the amount of $'250.00 (R-84-85) and
payment on the said check was stopped. ('R-98).
In Andreason v. Hansen, supra, Seller was defin'itely paid the earnest money recited in the agreem·ent. In the instant action, no earnest money whatsoever was paid under· the earnest money agreement sued upon. Thus, a ruling by the court as
urged by the Appellant that the instant case is governed by Andreason v. Hansen would be in effect
a ruling that a recitation in an earnest money ~agree
ment is binding upon the seller despite tlle fact
that no consideration whatsoever was paid. There
is no indication of such a rule in Andreason v Hansen or in McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 U.2d 142, 349
P.2d 720, or in Close v. Blumenthal, 11 U.2d 51, 354
P.2d 856. Indeed, such a rule as urged by Appellant
5
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would be contrary to the rule heretofore laid down by
this court in Afton Livestock Company v. Peterson,
62 Utah 437, 220 Pac. 710 (19'32), wherein the
court indicated that showing the true amount of
consideration paid is permissible. See a~so Paloni v.
Beebe, 100 Utah 115, 110 P. 2d ;563 (1940) !and
Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475,
2'5 'P .'2d 952 ( 1'933).
The language of the earnes~t money agreement
sued upon (Line 34) explicitly states that the
amounts paid may "at the option of the seller be
retained as liquidated and agreed damage's." By
stopping payment on the $250.00 check given as
earnest money, the Appellant has not lived up to
the agreement and has removed the option right to
any election of remedies that was available to Respondents. As ·stated in McKown v. Driver, 54 Wash.
2d. 46, 337 P.'2d 1068, 1073 (195'9), '~One is bound
by an election of remedies when all of three essentiial
conditions are present: ( 1) the existence of two
or more remedies a:t the time of tlle election ; ( 2)
inconsistency between such remedies; and ( 3) a
choice of one of them."
By stopping payment on the $2:50.00 check
given pursuant to 'the earnest money agreement, the
Appellant eliminated any election of remedies that
was available to Respondents and rendered it impossible for Respondents to comply With the rule
laid down by this court in Andreason v. Hansen and
cases thereunder because there was nothing to re1

6
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turn. Appellant, however, seeks to bring the instant
action back within the rule of Andreason v. Hansen
by asserting th!at because Appellant and Respondents entered into a completely separate and prior
earnest money agreement whereby Appe'llant pa'id
to Respondents the sum of $100.00, the Respondents
were obligated to return the said $100.00 prior to
filing suit on the earnest money agreement actually
sued upon. Broause of this contention by Appellant,
the trial court was forced to consider the ownership
of the subject $100.00 and of the agreement upon
whiCh it wa;s predicated. (R-H7). The trial court
concluded that the $100.00 was Respondents' money
under a separate and pri'or agreement and the crediting of this amount to Appellant by the real estate
agent involved operated only to reduce 'the earnest
money under the agreement sued upon from $3 50.00
to $250.00 (R-48-49). There is ample evidence in
the record to support 'tHis finding of the court. In
reviewing the evidence relied upon by the tri'al court,
it is noted that this court has eonsisten tly held that
on appeal from a judgment for the plaintiffs, the
evidence will be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Lewis v. Rio Grande Western
Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 Pac. 9'7.
1

The record discloses that Appellant obviously
understood that he had violate dthe earnest money
agreement of August 7, 1962, under which the
$100.00 was paid and that he had been requested
to move from Respondents' home. (R-141). Appel7
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lant further radmitted that he understood the first
earnest money agreement to have been terminated
as a result of his breach of this agreement ( Vatsis
Deposition, pp. 35, 38). It is further noted that the
Appe'llant offered no evidence whatsoever that tlle
$100.00 belonged to him whereas the Respondents
rat all times claimed ownership of the $'100.00 (R69, t3'8-l39). The trial court thus correctly held
that the $100.00 paid under ·the August 7, 1962
earnest money agreement was the property of Respondents and, therefore, the only effect of the real
estate agent crediting this amount to Appellant was
to reduce the amount of the earnest money deposit
required under the ~arnest money agreement that
was sued upon.
POINT 11
'THE TRIAL COURT ·CORRECTLY ASSESSED
DAMAGE'S AGAINST A!PPELLANT INAS MU:CH AS
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT HAVE 'MADE AN E LECTION .A!N'D CONSEQUENTLY THE DAMAGES WOULD
THEN BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OFFER AND THE ACTUAL MARKET VAUUE OF THE
PROPERTY.
1

1

1

Because no earnest money was paid under the
e·arnest money agreement sued upon, Respondents
are not bound 'by any liquidated damage clause in
that !agreement and therefore the measure of damages is as stated in Cole v. Parker, 5 Uuah 2d 263,
300 P.2d 6'23:
"Thus, in the absence of fraud, the seller is
entitled to be credited, in the computation of
damage sustained because of the breach of
1
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the contract, the difference between the contract price and the price for which he dan
sell the forfeited property . . ."

Andreason v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404
(19'59) states that the measure of damages is the
difference between the purchaser's offer and the actual market v:alue of the property. In Perkins v.
Spencer, 121 Utah 46'8, 243 P.2d 446, the court
again stated that the measure of damages is the
advantageous bargain lost by the ptaintiff, together
with damages for the fair rental value of the property during the period of occupancy.
It is without contradiction that Respondents
had to sell the property for $2,750.00 less than the
Appellant had agreed to pay (Exhibits R-144);
that Respondents incurred substan'tial expenses because of Appellant's breach (R-6'6, 74-7'5); that the
subsequent buyers were bona fide purchasers of
the home (R-87); and that Respondents were diligen't in their efforts to sell the property ( R-'86) .
Thus, the measure of dam:ages assessed by the
trial court was proper and consistent with the rul'.;
for ascertaining damages set forth by this court in
the Cole, Andreason and Perkins decisions cite\_~
above.
9
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CONCLUSION
'The findings of the triJal court that Respondents
never received any earnest money under the agreement sued upon are correct, and the measure of
damages assessed against Appellant are proper.
Respectfully submitted,
WATKINS & WILKINS
WAL'TER P. FABER, JR.
3'36 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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